SOC L2 · Detection Engineering · Vuln Research

Jakub Kozub

Two Critical findings in WordPress core and Gutenberg, fixed at disclosure.

SOC L2 analyst at Jagiellonian University. By day I tune detections and hunt threats; by night I read open-source code to find the access-control bugs scanners miss. Available for access-control reviews and detection engineering.

01 / disclosed research

One audit, two sinks, both Critical.

Reported to the WordPress security team through HackerOne, fixed, and now public — the full write-ups and triage threads are readable by anyone. Both came out of one audit of freshly added media-handling code in core trunk and the Gutenberg plugin, where the same attacker-controlled value in attachment metadata reached two different sinks.

Critical · CVSS 9.9 report #3931777

Author → arbitrary file deletion as the web-server user, leading to site takeover

A newly added REST route, POST /wp/v2/media/<id>/finalize, stored an attacker-supplied path verbatim in attachment metadata. Laundering it through the image editor moved it into protected meta, where the deletion routine built its directory guard from that same poisoned value — so the guard constrained nothing. The lowest role allowed to upload files could delete wp-config.php, or files outside the document root entirely.

Class
Path traversal · CWE-22
Privilege
Author — lowest role with upload_files
Vector
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected
Gutenberg 23.6.0 on WordPress 7.0 · core trunk during the 7.1 beta
Fixed in
Gutenberg 23.8 (#81465) · core r63200, before 7.1 shipped
Status
Resolved · disclosed 28 Aug 2026
Critical · CVSS 9.0 report #3931771

Author → stored XSS in wp-admin via an unescaped sub-size filename

The same controllable filename in attachment metadata was rendered unescaped by get_media_item(), breaking out of the src attribute in the admin media UI. Script then ran in the session of any administrator who merely opened the media library — no click on anything unusual, and nothing malformed in the request to catch.

Class
Stored XSS · CWE-79
Privilege
Author, executing as Administrator
Affected
Gutenberg 23.6.0 on WordPress 7.0 · core trunk during the 7.1 beta
Fixed in
Gutenberg 23.8 (#81465) · core r63200, before 7.1 shipped
Status
Resolved · disclosed 28 Aug 2026
Write-up How the 9.9 worked — the three hops, the exploit replayed, and what it leaves in the logs

Neither was a duplicate. More reports are in triage — hackerone.com/jakubk

02 / what you can order

Three things you can hire me for.

Contract work, taken alongside the day job. Every engagement ends in something you can check: a written report with a proof of concept rebuilt in a lab, or rules tested on your own logs.

Access-control review Authorization

One application: a plugin, an internal tool, a REST API. I map the code an unauthenticated or low-privileged request can reach and the guard on each path. The usual gaps are a nonce standing in for authorization and a capability check standing in for an ownership check, and scanners miss both.

Scope
One codebase · every entry point a request can reach
You get
The reachable entry points, ranked by who can reach them, and a report per confirmed finding

Research on a component you depend on Vuln research

Code you run but did not write, audited the way I found the WordPress 9.9: recent changes first, one attacker-controlled value followed across subsystems. Nothing is filed until it is rebuilt in a lab; if the code is not yours, the report can go to its maintainer through coordinated disclosure.

Scope
One component you depend on · usually open source
You get
A report per finding, in the form of report #3931777

Detection engineering Blue team

A finding, an incident or a threat model turned into detections that run on your logs, each with the log sources it needs, tested against traffic you already have and tuned to stay quiet until it matters. The rules for my 9.9 are public, tests included.

Scope
One finding, incident or threat model · your own log sources
You get
The rules, the log sources each one needs, and what to do when one fires

Remote, from Kraków. This is my own work, taken on independently of my employer and not on their behalf. Say what you run and what worries you — contact@jakubkozub.com

03 / whoami

From the alert to the source code.

By day I'm a SOC L2 analyst: triage, threat hunting, and writing or tuning the detections that catch the next one. What holds my attention is the part the logs only hint at, and chasing it far enough usually ends with the source open. That habit is what pulled me from defense into vulnerability research.

After hours I hunt broken authorization in open-source software a lot of people depend on. The two Critical findings above are in WordPress; I am currently auditing Elastic, GitLab and Matomo. The class hides well, because nothing about the request looks malformed. Nothing gets filed until I've rebuilt it in a lab, and I read every finding from the other side as well: what it leaves in the logs, and what would stop it in production.

04 / things I have shipped

What I build.

Security first: the open-source tools I wrote for my own engagements and the classifier from my MSc thesis. Below them, what I build outside security — each one live, and each written by me end to end, from the engine to the deployment.

Security

Security tooling OSS

Small single-purpose tools from my own bug-bounty work: MIT, standard library only, no telemetry. wp-authz-audit maps the WordPress plugin code an attacker can reach and the guard on each handler. evidence-redaction-gate fails an evidence export that still holds a session cookie or a token. redact-request shares the shape of a captured HTTP request, never its contents.

Phishing detector MSc thesis

Three ways to catch phishing, compared for my MSc in Information Technology at AHE Łódź: TF-IDF with logistic regression, a fine-tuned DistilBERT, and a zero-shot language model. In the offline demo both trained models reach F1 0.98 on 1,000 balanced e-mails; a local 1.5B model reaches 0.74 on a 60-message sample, but it is the only one that says in plain Polish why a message is phishing.

Also built

  • brydz.uk Duplicate bridge for two people in two cities. Each table is a Durable Object that redacts every hand before it leaves the server.
Four more: an Android game, two language courses and a site
  • MATURA English vocabulary for the Polish matura, built as an Android game; speech recognition marks the spoken answers. On Google Play.
  • francuski.org French B1/B2 explained in English, with a Polish edition generated from the same source.
  • dziendobry.org Polish for Spanish speakers, A0–A1, on one self-contained page, with dialogues read aloud by a neural voice.
  • aleimamartinez.com A site for someone else: loads in under a second, stores nothing, needs no cookie banner.

05 / credentials

The paper trail, briefly.

Certificates, competitions and degrees, kept short on purpose. The work itself is in the research section.

Certifications

  • BTL2 — Blue Team Level 2 Security Blue Team · 2026
  • eWPTX — Web Application Penetration Tester eXtreme INE · 2026 · verify
  • eCTHP — Certified Threat Hunting Professional INE · 2026 · verify
  • CDSA — Certified Defensive Security Analyst Hack The Box · 2026 · ID HTBCERT-D0D266C900
  • BTL1 — Blue Team Level 1 Security Blue Team · 2026 · ID 457343060

CTF — 4× podium, 2× 1st

  • 1st ThreatOps CTF SIEM / Threat Intel
  • 1st SIEM / TI Cloud CTF cloud detection
  • 2nd XDR CTF Trend Micro UK
  • 3rd Vision One European CTF
  • finalist Splunk SIEM CTF Warsaw

Education

  • MSc Information Technology AHE Łódź · AI phishing thesis
  • Postgrad Cybersecurity Univ. of Warsaw · red team
  • MA English Philology Univ. of Warsaw · CALL thesis

Career

  • SOC L2 Jagiellonian University detection & response
  • Before that SOC L1 → L2, teaching, translation
  • Full history on LinkedIn — no point keeping two copies

Languages

  • English full professional
  • Spanish professional working
  • Polish native

06 / establish connection

Let's talk detection & disclosure.

Write if you work on detection engineering, DFIR, application security or coordinated disclosure. I'm settled at Jagiellonian University and take on contract work alongside it: security research, access-control reviews and detection engineering.

contact@jakubkozub.com